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Abstract
This paper investigates the reasons that determine students’ mobility in Italy and
tries to explain why in the presence of quality differentials among universities the ma-
jority of students choose to remain in their regions of origin. We find that low mobility is
related to family income and other financial and background characteristics. Low mobil-
ity in turn implies the existence of little competition among universities, and hence little
incentive for improvement in either teaching or research. A crucial issue is therefore to
evaluate if and how the government may affect this process and improve the supply of
higher education quality and the degree of competition among academic institutions.
JEL classification: I21, I28,
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1 Introduction
It is well understood in the economic literature that students’ regional migration is rele-
vant for designing correct educational policies. On this respect, educational policies need
to set the appropriate level of resources to be devoted to higher education programs and
to match qualification requirements needed by the economic activities in the region with
the number and characteristics of the graduates. This topic has recently received special
attention, since it has been recognized that the geographical mobility of students influences
not only regional education policies but also the development and the growth path of local
economies, as well as regional convergence. In particular, the theme of students’ mobility
∗An early version of this paper was presented at the conference “Education quality, institutions, and financial
constraints”, University of Turin, May 24th, 2006. We would like to thank, without implicating, the participants
at the conference and Daniele Checchi for insightful comments.
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has been extensively studied in the international literature aiming at evaluating to what ex-
tent individual, socio-economic and quality factors may determine the propensity to move
(Baryla and Dotterweich, 2001; Dotterweich and Baryla, 2005; Hsing and Mixon, 1996; Sa`
et al., 2006).
At a microeconomic level, the individual choice of the university on the part of college
students is driven by expected utility considerations and influenced by pecuniary and non-
pecuniary costs. However, the specific factors influencing students’ mobility are not clearly
identified, but it is reasonable to think that the decision of moving is related to multi-level
variables featuring the local labour market and the behavior of the economy, the family
background and the households’ financial endowment, the students’ characteristics and the
supply and quality of university facilities in the origin area and in the region of destination.
Taking the case of Italy, existing evidence (Brunello and Cappellari, 2005) suggests that
the returns from college education are higher in the North of the country, but also that there
is low students’ inter-regional mobility. Hence, although employment probabilities and ex-
pected wages could be higher for students attending northern universities while monetary
costs and fees are similar in the North and in the South of the country, there is low mobility
among areas. Other studies also address the issue of students’ mobility in Italy, finding that
both university characteristics and socio-economic conditions of the geographical areas in
which individuals are located are important (Agasisti and Dal Bianco, 2007).
This paper focuses on the internal regional mobility of Italian college graduates. We
evaluate how students’ inter-regional mobility is related to different factors in four Italian
macro-areas, exploiting the properties of a varying-parameter model. Therefore, we explore
which are the factors influencing the decisions of students to move in regions different from
the region of origin. In particular, we evaluate the effect of family income and other financial
and background characteristics on the students’ choice to attend universities located in a
region different from the region of residence.
The empirical analysis is developed in a Bayesian framework. The reason of this choice
is threefold. First, it allows us to estimate a rather flexible varying-parameters model, where
parameters are not constant across macro-areas. Second, by using a Bayesian framework we
can carry out inference on quantities that combine both estimated parameters and data in a
straightforward fashion. This feature allows us to comment our empirical findings directly
in terms of the (probability) mean marginal effects of the explanatory variables, not in terms
of the parameters values. In our opinion this is a big advantage. Last but not least, given that
we can derive by simulation an approximation to the exact finite sample posterior densities
of the parameters of interest, we don’t need to rely on asymptotic properties in carrying out
our inferences, nor we have to rely on unobserved data.1
The next two Sections are devoted to an illustration of the individual choice problem and
its relations with the family and local background. The empirical analysis is carried out in
Section 4. The last Section concludes.
1Of course, there are other theoretical reasons why one could prefer a Bayesian framework. The interested
reader can refer to Appendix 1 in Lancaster (2004) for a quick summary.
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2 Modelling Students’ Mobility
Theoretical studies investigating the determinants of students’ mobility focus on individual
and socio-economic background as well as on geographical distance and education qual-
ity in an expected utility maximization framework (Mixon, 1992; Mixon and Hsing, 1994;
Frenette, 2006). We set a theoretical reference model where movements between the origin
regions o and the destination regions m are based on a comparison of net expected returns
subject to budget constraints. If:
Vmio =
∞∫
0
ψmio
w∫
0
wdFmw
 e−rtdt− Cmio (1)
is the expected value of moving for the i individual from region o, o = 1, 2, ...k to region m,
m = 1, 2, ...k, r is the discount factor, ψmio represents the probability of finding a job having
moved for studying. In case of employment the expected real wage is given by
∫ w¯
0 wdF
m
w
which depends on the wage distribution Fmw . The cost of moving from the origin region can
be written as a function of several components:
Cmio = C (Mio,Oio, Dio) (2)
where Mio are direct pecuniary costs, including university fees, Oio may be considered a
fixed cost of leaving the origin region which depends on a number of individual character-
istics such as age, marital status, home ownership and family socioeconomic background.
Dio are additional variable costs which may depend on the region of destination and dis-
tance. For example, psychological costs possibly related to distance or information costs
related to the existence of social networks.
The expected value of studying in the region of origin may be represented as:
Voio =
∞∫
0
ψoio
w∫
0
wdFow
 e−rtdt (3)
where for simplicity we assume that Coio = 0. The individual moves when:
Vmio −Voio > 0 (4)
unless budget constraints are binding and the credit market is imperfect. In practice the
following condition must also hold:
Mio ≤ Yh + Ah (5)
where Yh is the household’s disposable income and Ah are available assets.
Indeed, there is no need for the budget constraint to be strictly binding for income and
wealth to be important in formulating the choice of the university to be attended. Income
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and wealth can enter the decision formation process directly as components of the individ-
ual’s utility function as
Ui = f {(Vmio −Voio), (Yh + Ah −Mio)} (6)
where utility of moving, Ui, is positively related to both components.
To sum up, this framework predicts that the decision of moving depends on individual,
households and local characteristics. On top of that, we consider the possibility that param-
eters relating individual and household variables with the probability of moving are not
constant across macro-areas. In practice. we explicitly consider how individuals with sim-
ilar attributes, living in households with comparable characteristics, may have a different
behavior in different macro-areas.
3 Mobility determinants
The basic theoretical set-up outlined in the previous Section states that the decision of at-
tending a specific university, in the origin region or outside, depends on variables which
shape the individual’s net expected utility. This is determined by the future employment
opportunities, by the expected monetary returns and by the pecuniary and non pecuniary
costs. These variables in turn depend on the characteristics of students and households as
well as on the socioeconomic macro environment.
3.1 Individual and household’s characteristics
Individual and household characteristics affect individual mobility decisions since they de-
termine the specific expected utility values and migration costs. In particular, individual-
level covariates encompass gender, age, birth order, race/ethnicity, urban/rural origins,
marital status, role in the family. The educational status and the individual ability, that can
be measured by grades obtained in high school, may also determine the probability of mov-
ing for studying. Interestingly, even gender ma be considered a variable which can influence
the decision of moving. In the recent migration literature (see e.g Pessar and Mahler, 2003;
Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2003) it has been pointed out how a seemingly gender-neutral process
of movement is, in fact, highly gender-specific and may result in differential outcomes for
men and women. The interaction of women’s roles, status, and age within a sociocultural
context results in a specific propensity to migrate.
Family factors include size, age/sex composition, structure (nuclear, extended, etc.), sta-
tus (single parent, both parents, etc.), and class status. The family educational background
has always been recognized as a crucial variable in determining the investment in human
capital and the schooling decisions (see e.g. Shea, 2000; Carneiro and Heckman, 2002; Chec-
chi, 2003). Students from families with a higher cultural background tend to attend high
quality schools/universities and to have higher propensity to move. As long as liquidity
constraints may be binding in determining the decision to move, households’ income and
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financial position (including home ownership) need to be considered when evaluating the
choice of studying outside the origin region. The recent literature (Carneiro and Heckman,
2002) points out how the long-term effects of living in a wealthy family override the basic
direct short-term impact since they have an effect on students’ general abilities.
3.2 Macro determinants and local characteristics
Macro level covariates vary across regions and are supposed to capture observed utility
differences between alternative destinations as suggested by the theoretical framework de-
veloped in Section 2. The characteristics of both the region of origin and the region of des-
tination can influence the mobility propensities. Moreover, these characteristics can interact
with the individual and household relations and affect decisions about studying location.
Macro covariates include: the state of the economy (agrarian, industrial, the level of devel-
opment); labour market conditions and conditions of work (wage levels, benefits); the ability
of the economy to provide jobs and the type of jobs available; the number of industries; the
ability of the national and local government to provide related infrastructure (education, job
training); the geographic location of the destination region with respect to the native region.
Social factors include those community norms and cultural values that determine whether
or not student can migrate and, if they can, how (i.e., labour or family reunification) and
with whom (alone or with the family).
4 The data and the statistical model
The data are taken from the Bank of Italy’s survey of Italian households’ income and wealth
(SHIW). Indeed, SHIW is not specifically intended to be used to investigate education-related
decisions. In this respect, other data sources may be more appropriate.2 However, using the
information contained in SHIW, we can merge education-related variables with financial
information on individuals and households. To the best of our knowledge, this is a unique
feature of SHIW. In order to have a larger number of observations, we use two recent waves
of the survey (2002 and 2004: see Bank of Italy, 2004, 2006), being careful not to include the
same individuals twice when they are present in both waves. Unfortunately, the most recent
wave of the survey (which refers to 2006) does not include the relevant information for our
enquiry.
Selected individuals are all graduated, so that we are carrying out a conditional analysis.
Furthermore, they are not themselves head of households. Given the structure of the survey,
this step was necessary in order to identify movers from non-movers. Of course this can be
considered as a limitation to the analysis. However, the vast majority of Italian graduates
fall in this category and we believe that we can gather important information even in the
presence of data limitations.
2One such example is Istat (2005). However, this data source suffers from other problems. Apart from not
reporting information about income and wealth, Istat (2005) does not allow to identify the region of residence
of the movers. Indeed Istat (2005) tend to focus more on the decision of moving after graduating. Furthermore,
regretfully some interesting answers to the questionnaire are blanked to non-Istat users.
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Variable Description
y Dependent variable: 1 if the individual moved to a different
region, 0 otherwise.
x0 Intercept.
x1 Low income: household’s per-capita income less than the
first quartile.
x2 High income: household’s per-capita income more than the
third quartile.
x3 Low-educated head of household (up to middle school).
x4 High-educated head of household (university degree or
higher).
x5 Gender: 1 if female, 0 otherwise.
x6 The household lives in a small city (less than 40,000 inhab-
itants).
x7 The head of household is older than 64.
x8 Number of universities in the region of residence.
Table 1 – Variables used in the analysis.
Prior to statistical analysis, the data are cleaned and missing observations are eliminated.
Therefore, we are left with 523 individuals, about 18% of which decided to move to a differ-
ent region3 to study and obtain their university degrees.4 Overall, the percentage of movers
in Italy is very low as compared to other European countries. In fact, Naylor et al. (2001)
report that about 88% of the college students in the UK chose to study in a different region
with respect to where the parental home is located.
It is interesting to notice that, according to our data, the percentage of movers is highly
variable across macro-areas, being 9.4% in the North-West, 15.6% in the North-East, 21.3%
in the Centre, and 20.4% in the South. A detailed description of the variables used in the
analysis is reported in Table 15 and some descriptive statistics are offered in Table 2.
Of course, the percentage of movers by macro-area is estimated as 100 ny/n, with ny
the number of movers and n the sample size, from macro-area specific samples. Given that
the sample size of macro-area specific subsamples is limited, one might wonder which is
3In this paper we denote by “region” the official NUTS2 classification. By “macro-area” we denote the official
NUTS1 classification with the modification of considering “South” and “Islands” as a whole geographical entity
that we call “South”. However, the classification of the regions (NUTS2) in the four macro-areas (North-West,
North-East, Centre and South) of the country follows the official classification used by the Italian National
Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).
4The definition of “mover” is related to the decision of moving to a different region, independently of the
region being in the same macro-area (North-West, North-East, Centre or South) or not. The aggregate figure
we obtain from the Bank of Italy’s surveys (17.6%) is broadly consistent with the analog ratio estimated using
Istat (2005) data and with the aggregated proportion of movers (19.2%) computed on data made available by
the Ministry of the University for the academic year 2003/2004.
5Other variables have been tentatively used in different parameterizations of the model that included house-
holds’ net wealth and different proxies for students’ quality and ability (including high school graduation marks
and university degree final grades). However, they did not prove useful to explain individual choices, being
always largely insignificant. Therefore, they have been excluded from the final model. Explanatory variables re-
lated to the destination region pose some problems of interpretability, in particular as far as the non-movers are
concerned. To take into account the characteristics of both origins and destinations, a full flow analysis should
be performed, which is beyond the scope of the present paper.
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NW NE CE SO Italy
Movers 9.4 15.6 21.3 20.4 17.6
Low income 13.5 15.6 22.1 48.5 29.1
High income 34.4 36.7 18.9 13.8 23.5
Low educated 54.2 42.2 53.3 42.9 47.2
High educated 16.7 12.8 12.3 26.0 18.4
Female 55.2 48.6 51.6 59.7 54.7
Small city 18.8 26.6 25.4 19.9 22.4
Elder head of household 15.6 12.8 16.4 21.4 17.4
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics (percentages).
Mean Low High Pr(θNW < θi)
NW 10.1 5.3 15.0
NE 16.3 10.6 21.9 90.6
CE 21.7 15.8 27.7 99.1
SO 20.5 15.9 25.1 99.2
Table 3 – Interval estimation of the percentage of movers in the population by macro-area.
“Mean” represents the average of the posterior distribution of the parameter, “Low” and “High”
are the lower and upper limit of the 90% highest posterior density interval (HPDI), respectively.
Pr(θNW < θi) denotes the probability that the proportion in the North-West is less than the pro-
portion in the specified macro-area. These values have been obtained using 10,000 simulations.
the percentage in the population (in the statistical sense) instead. Therefore we estimate
the proportion of movers in the population by macro-area by using a simulation approach.
In particular, denoting by θ the unknown population proportion of movers, we assume an
uninformative prior such that θ ∼ U(0, 1). With this prior we are simply assuming a priori
that the true proportion is somewhere between 0 and 1 with equal probabilities. Under
independence and constant θ it can be shown (see e.g. Gelman et al., 2004) that the posterior
for θ is
θ|ny ∼ Beta(ny + 1, n− ny + 1) . (7)
It is easy to simulate this distribution using macro-area specific values for ny and n and
obtain in this way an interval estimation of the percentage of movers in each macro-area.
In particular, for each macro-area we estimate the Highest Posterior Density Intervals, that is
the Bayesian confidence intervals (or credibility intervals) such that θL and θH determine the
shortest interval for which Pr(θL ≤ θ ≤ θH) = α (0 < α < 1). In our computations we
consider α = 0.9. We also compute the probability that the true value of the proportion of
movers in the North-West is less than the proportion of movers in the other macro-areas (see
Table 3).
Even allowing for substantial sample uncertainty, the probability that the population
percentage of movers can be considered as equal among macro-areas is indeed very low. In
fact, the population percentage of movers appears to be substantially lower in the northern
regions than it is in the central and southern part of the country.
We suspect that, because of differences in economic environments and social conven-
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tions, not only the average percentages of movers are different across macro-areas, but also
the individual decision process may be different. To the best of our knowledge, there is just
some anecdotic evidence in this direction but, as far as we know, no serious statistical evi-
dence has been proposed so far. For this reason we believe that it is useful to build a flexible
logit model where parameters are allowed to vary across macro-areas. Specifically, we build
a varying-parameter logit model where the decision to move or not to move on the part of
individual i in macro-area r is represented by
yr,i ∼ Bern(pir,i) (8)
logit(pir,i) = β0,r + β1,rx1,r,i + . . . + βk,rxk,r,i (9)
where Bern(pir,i) is the Bernoulli distribution with parameter pir,i. Note that, consistently
with our idea that individual decision may differ across macro-areas, we assume area-
specific parameters. Indeed, the model can be considered as a stylized multilevel model
without predictors (for the parameters). Therefore, we don’t need to arbitrarily pick up one
region as the reference one, as we would have to do by using a classical regression with indi-
cator variables.6 In our model, the varying intercepts account for the (fixed) characteristics
of the macro-area of origin.
Given that the number of groups (macro-areas) is small (indeed, just 4) and that there are
many varying parameters, the option of setting and estimating the model using a Bayesian
approach can be advantageous. Also, as already highlighted in the introduction, the Bayesian
approach allows us to derive the finite sample distributions of the parameters, as well as the
finite sample distributions of quantities involving both parameters and data. This allows us
in particular to derive interval estimations for the mean marginal effects of each explanatory
variable in a rather natural way. Therefore, we complete the model with fairly standard
priors on βr := (β1, . . . , βk). In particular we assume
βr ∼ Nk
(
µβ,Σβ
)
(10)
µβ,j ∼ N (0, 1000) j = 0, . . . , k (11)
Σβ ∼ InvWish(k + 3) (12)
where Nk
(
µβ,Σβ
)
indicates the multivariate normal distribution with (vector) mean µβ
and covariance matrix Σβ, N(µ, σ2) is the normal with (scalar) mean µ and variance σ2 and
InvWish(ν) denotes the inverse-Wishart distribution with ν degrees of freedom.7 These pri-
ors, beside being rather conventional, do not impose strong constraints on the parameters.
Indeed, though the proposed priors on the β’s are proper, they are also extremely vague. In
6Following the suggestion of an Editor, we also estimate a standard logit model with interactions between
macro-areas and income and education variables. The results are qualitatively similar to those derived using the
Bayesian model, but the coefficients have to be interpreted in terms of deviations from the reference area (in our
case, NW). Also, in a “classical” logit model it is more difficult to derive the finite sample distributions of the
parameters and their probability implications. For all these reasons we prefer our Bayesian model. However,
we report the results of the standard logit model in the appendix for completeness.
7The inverse-Wishart distribution is the conjugate prior distribution for the multivariate normal covariance
matrix. For a k× k covariance matrix it is required ν > k.
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Figure 1 – Potential scale reduction factors (Gelman and Rubin, 1992). The x’s indicate the
parameter (0 for the constant and so on — see Table 1). Values close to 1 indicate convergence.
All the results are obtained from 6 chains of effective length 1000.
order to be realistic, we use a non-diagonal covariance matrix Σβ to take into account that
the β’s are not independent. However, as a robustness check, simpler independent priors
on the β’s have also been specified. In particular, we assumed the simple independent prior
βr,k ∼ N(0, 1000) ∀r, k. The results do not differ substantially from the proposed model.8
The model has been estimated by Monte Carlo Markov Chains (MCMC) using R and
WinBUGS (R Development Core Team, 2006; Spiegelhalter et al., 2004). Six independent
chains of length 1000 (excluding the burn-in replications) have been used to derive the pos-
terior distributions of the parameters. The starting values of the chains were randomly
selected from a N(bˆ, Ik) distribution, with bˆ representing the nation-wide estimates of a
standard logit model.
Following Gelman et al. (2002), most of the results are reported graphically. However,
for completeness and readability, we also report a table with the numerical values of the
estimated parameters (Table 4).
Convergence was quickly reached for all the parameters of the model, as indicated by
the potential scale reduction factors (Gelman and Rubin, 1992) reported in Figure 1.
Given that the random coefficient model is substantially more complicated than a stan-
8However, on the basis of the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC, Spiegelhalter et al., 2002), the original
model has to be preferred. In fact, the DIC of the original model is 452.6, while the DIC of the model with
independent priors is 468.5, leading one to reject the model with independent priors in favour of the complete
model (see Spiegelhalter et al., 2002, p. 613).
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dard logit model, in order to check if considering varying parameters is really useful, a
standard logit model has also been estimated in a Bayesian framework and the Deviance In-
formation Criteria (DIC, Spiegelhalter et al., 2002) of the two models have been compared.
The DIC for the standard logit was 469.9, while we obtained a substantially lower value
(452.6) for the random coefficients logit. According to Spiegelhalter et al. (2002, p. 613), this
result should be interpreted as being strongly in favour of the model with varying parame-
ters.
In order to check if the model fits the data well, a possibility is to perform a posterior pre-
dictive simulation analysis. In practice, one has to compare the observed data to replicated
data sets simulated using the model (see e.g. Gelman et al., 2000; Geweke and McCausland,
2001). In particular it is possible to simulate for each individual
yreplr,i ∼ Bern
(
logit−1
(
xr,i β
l
r
))
(13)
where βlr is a draw from the posterior distribution of βr and xr,i is the vector of explicative
variables relative to individual i in region r. By simulating (13) for each individual 5,000
times, we obtain 5,000 replicated samples. If the model adequately describes the data, then
the simulated data must mimic the observed ones.
An obvious check regards the fraction of movers for each macro-area. The results are
reported in Figure 2 that represents the posterior predictive distributions of the proportion
of movers in each macro-aea, as compared to the observed proportions. Notice that the
model fits the data well in this respect: in fact, the average proportions computed over the
simulated data are very close to the actual proportions of movers. Furthermore, the two-
sided p-values are always very high, indicating that the proportions of movers implied by
the model and those observed in reality are well in accordance.9
However, Figure 3 suggests that the model fits the data better for the central and south-
ern regions than it does for the northern ones. In particular, in the North-west only a few
observations where yi = 1 are available and the range of fitted probabilities is small, indi-
cating a likely poor predictive performance of the model in those regions. In this respect,
it is fair to say that some of the best-renowned universities in Italy are located precisely in
the north-western regions. Also, only a few potential outliers are apparent in those areas
in which there is a relatively large number of observations. However, it should be noticed
that, precisely because of the varying number of available observations, this is an expected
result.
Estimated parameters are reported in Table 4 and graphically in Figure 4 using a com-
mon scale for ease of interpretation.
However, given that logistic regression coefficients do not have a direct probability in-
terpretation, we compute also the mean marginal effect of each explanatory variable.
Making inferences on the mean marginal effects is usually a difficult task in a non-
9Denoting with T(y, β) the quantity of interest (in our case the proportion of movers) the two-sided p-value
is defined as 2 min(p, 1− p), where p := Pr
[
T(yrepl ,β) > T(y, β)|y,β
]
.
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Figure 2 – Posterior predictive distributions of the proportion of movers by region. The solid
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11
ll
llll
lll ll l
0.0 0.4 0.8
−
1.
0
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
North−west
Fitted probability
R
es
id
ua
l
+++ +
+
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
ll
l
0.0 0.4 0.8
−
1.
0
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
North−east
Fitted probability
R
es
id
ua
l
+ +
+
+
+
++
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.0 0.4 0.8
−
1.
0
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
Center
Fitted probability
R
es
id
ua
l
+
+
++
++
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
lll ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.0 0.4 0.8
−
1.
0
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
South
Fitted probability
R
es
id
ua
l
+
+ +
+++
+
+
+
++
+++
+
++
+
Figure 3 – Posterior distributions of the residuals ri = yi − pi plotted against E(pi|y), with pi :=
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the distribution. Observations that significantly cross the dotted lines correspond to potential
outliers.
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Parameter Area Mean Low High
Intercept NW -1.4806 -2.6180 -0.2842
NE 0.0015 -1.0230 0.9147
CE -0.4599 -1.4930 0.5194
SO -0.0359 -0.8069 0.7536
Low income NW -0.0053 -1.1130 1.2690
NE -0.9125 -1.8890 0.0085
CE -0.7816 -1.5450 0.0501
SO -0.9346 -1.5920 -0.2670
High income NW -1.0033 -2.0780 0.1041
NE -0.0287 -0.8064 0.7554
CE -0.3846 -1.1480 0.4235
SO -0.0492 -0.7306 0.6411
Low education NW -0.7286 -1.6990 0.2168
NE 0.2527 -0.4945 0.9817
CE -0.2533 -0.8916 0.4272
SO 0.1467 -0.4861 0.8275
High education NW 0.5668 -0.4695 1.6390
NE 0.9825 0.0740 1.8400
CE 1.3422 0.4594 2.1250
SO 0.8316 0.1722 1.5620
Gender NW 0.4616 -0.4488 1.3570
NE 0.4107 -0.2352 1.1220
CE 0.4201 -0.1982 1.0280
SO 0.1855 -0.3679 0.7555
Small city NW 0.0575 -0.9387 1.1600
NE 0.5765 -0.1901 1.3130
CE 0.0776 -0.5911 0.7570
SO 0.5054 -0.0831 1.1280
Age > 64 NW -0.6144 -1.7510 0.5249
NE -0.4808 -1.4210 0.4026
CE -0.8945 -1.7360 -0.0229
SO -0.5400 -1.2340 0.1690
Number of universities NW -0.0546 -0.1566 0.0516
NE -0.6441 -0.9554 -0.3529
CE -0.1568 -0.2960 0.0060
SO -0.3743 -0.5391 -0.2059
Table 4 – Estimated parameters. “Mean” represents the average of the posterior distribution of
the parameter, “Low” and “High” are the lower and upper limit of the 90% highest posterior
density interval (HPDI), respectively.
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Figure 4 – Estimated parameters. The dots indicate the medians of the posterior distribu-
tions. The vertical lines and the “×” represent 90% and 80% highest posterior density intervals
(HPDIs), respectively. Macro-areas are indicated using their abbreviations (NW, NE, CE, SO).
The same scale is used for all parameters for ease of interpretation. Numerical values are listed
in Table 4.
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Figure 5 – Mean marginal effects. The dots indicate the medians of the posterior distribu-
tions. The vertical lines and the “×” represent 90% and 80% highest posterior density intervals
(HPDIs), respectively. Macro-areas are indicated using their abbreviations (NW, NE, CE, SO).
The same scale is used for all mean marginal effects for ease of interpretation.
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Bayesian framework, since they involve both parameters and data. In particular, the mean
marginal effect of the j-th explanatory variable over a sample of n individuals in a logit
model with explanatory variables zi := (zi1, . . . , zik)′ (i = 1, . . . , n) and parameters γ :=
(γ1, . . . ,γk) can be written as
n−1
n
∑
i=1
∂Pr(yi = 1)
∂zij
= γj n−1
n
∑
i=1
ez
′
iγ(
1 + ez′iγ
)2 . (14)
Using a Bayesian approach, the posterior of this quantity can be computed directly from the
posteriors of γ, thus allowing us to derive the distribution of each marginal effect and to
carry out inference.10
The mean marginal effects are relatively uncertain for most variables, but some indica-
tions emerge quite clearly (see Figure 5).
In fact, the evidence suggests that family income exerts an important role in shaping
individual decisions to move in most areas, but this influence seems related more to a pos-
sible budget constraint effect rather than to a generic income effect. The role of financial
constraints on students’ mobility is becoming increasingly relevant in the recent debate.
For example, Frenette (2007), using data for Canada, finds that students from lower-income
families saw the largest increase in university participation following the creation of a local
degree-granting institution. This is consistent with the notion that distance poses a financial
barrier. Indeed, in our model, while low income tends to be associated with lower prob-
abilities of moving (the probability decreasing on average by approximately 10-15%), high
income does not appear to symmetrically increase the probability of choosing universities
far from home. In this respect, our results seem broadly consistent with the findings of
Frenette (2007). However, it should be noted that the negative low-income effect is impor-
tant in all areas, except the North-West, where some of the most highly reputed universities
are located.
The education of the head of household is generally important in increasing the proba-
bility of choosing a university in a different region, especially so in the central regions where
it can increase the probability of moving by approximately 20%. The effect is important also
in the north-eastern and southern regions, where the probability of moving increases by
about 10%. Apparently, better-educated parents are more keen to invest in their children’s
human capital. However, this result possibly indicate also a “search for quality” effect on
the part of the more educated households. It is possible that more educated parents are also
more informed (or more able to elaborate an independent judgement) about colleges qual-
ity. Instead, a low level of education of the head of the household is not associated with a
symmetrically negative effect. We feel that this result is interesting and broadly consistent
with the international literature (see e.g. Shea, 2000; Carneiro and Heckman, 2002; Checchi,
2003; Siegfried and Getz, 2006).
10In the frequentist approach it is of course possible to compute a point estimate of the mean marginal effects.
However, deriving interval estimates and evaluating the statistical significance of the effects is a much more
difficult task.
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Contrary to our expectations, gender does not appear to be associated with any particu-
larly clear pattern. We expected that traditional views that tend to maintain females closer
to the family might be important in shaping the probability of moving, especially in the
southern regions. Instead, we could not find any such discriminatory pattern. Of course
this is a good result, in cultural terms.
As far as the dimension of the town of origin is concerned, it seems that a positive associ-
ation exists between living in a small town in the North-East or the South with the decision
of moving.
The presence of an elder head of household tends to be associated with a lower probabil-
ity of moving, especially in central and southern regions, where family links are traditionally
stronger.
Finally, the number of universities in the region11 of origin is obviously important, being
the main supply indicator. Larger numbers of universities in the region mean more opportu-
nity to choose on the part of the students, and corresponding lower probabilities of moving
to another region to complete the studies.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper investigates the reasons that determine students’ mobility, explaining why even
in the presence of quality differentials among universities the students may choose to re-
main in their regions of origin. We find that the relatively low mobility of Italian university
students is related to family income and other financial and background characteristics. In
particular, although employment probabilities and expected wages seem to be higher for
students attending Northern universities, while monetary costs and fees are similar in the
North and in the South of the country, there exists a low mobility among areas. This could
imply the existence of little competition among universities, and hence little incentive for
improvement in either teaching or research. A crucial issue is therefore to evaluate if and
how the government may affect this process and improve the supply of higher education
quality and the degree of competition among academic institutions.
The existing debate considers that the reform of the educational system must confront
the issues of the degree of governmental ownership, the degree of governmental subsidy
and the degree of competition. Recently, in Italy the traditional highly centralized state
control has decreased and there is no longer the strong control over universities that was
present until some years ago. A large amount of autonomy has been granted and the fac-
ulties have much stronger influence on the governing of individual universities. However,
this does not seem to have increased the competition or reduced the quality differentials
among universities.
A crucial issue is to evaluate if the government may affect the quality by changing the
level of spending for higher education. In particular, it is relevant to evaluate the right
instruments to implement this policy: tax exemptions, educational vouchers or direct subsi-
11Note that this is the number of universities that are present in the region of residence, not in the macro-area.
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dies to the universities. According to our model, if credit constraints are really binding or if
households are exposed at the risk of being liquidity constrained, the first two instruments
might be more effective in improving the quality of education by breaking local monop-
olies and increasing competition among universities, especially in those areas where the
financial markets are less developed or the accessibility to the credit market on the part of
the household is seriously limited.12 However, appropriate loan policies are possibly not
sufficient. Our results seem to suggest that in order to have relevant effects, these poli-
cies should perhaps be coupled with better information policies. In this paper we suggest
that more educated parents are not only more prone to invest in their children’s education,
but also are more likely to be more informed or able to elaborate independent judgements
on colleges’ quality, perhaps because they themselves have been university students some
years before, to say the least. It would be important that the results of serious evaluation
exercises would be easily made available to anyone interested in choosing the university to
attend. In other words, public information on actual university quality is important. The
degree of competition among universities may be undoubtedly improved by raising the in-
dividuals’ information about universities’ characteristics and students’ performance in the
labour market. Serious research and teaching quality evaluation programs attached to suf-
ficiently strong incentives should in principle be able to increase universities competition
both in terms of recruitment and capacity of attracting the best students. Of course, the re-
sults of these evaluation exercises should be made easily available and easily interpretable
to the general public, so that the “search for quality effect” does not remain confined to the
best informed households only. At present, there is only little experience in evaluating the
Italian educational system and in publishing the evaluation’s results.13
However, we believe that the monopoly power of local universities may be regulated
effectively also by modifying structural characteristics and institutions operating in the re-
gional economies. Inefficiencies in the credit market and liquidity constraints may induce
high mobility costs among areas and consequently influence the supply of quality.
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Appendix: the standard logit with interactions
In this appendix we report the results deriving from the estimation of a standard logit model,
where the coefficients related to income and education variables are allowed to interact with
the macro-area indicator.
Though the coefficients of this model are not directly comparable with those of our
Bayesian model for the reasons explained in the main text, nevertheless, the results are
broadly consistent.
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(> |z|)
Intercept -0.4785 0.7742 -0.6180 0.5365
NE -1.2255 0.8861 -1.3830 0.1667
CE -0.2277 0.7838 -0.2910 0.7714
SO -0.1101 0.7615 -0.1450 0.8850
Low income 1.6636 0.9396 1.7710 0.0766
High income -1.4397 1.1585 -1.2430 0.2140
Low education -1.8193 0.9597 -1.8960 0.0580
High education -0.0134 0.9835 -0.0140 0.9891
Gender 0.3171 0.2563 1.2370 0.2160
Small city 0.4151 0.2834 1.4650 0.1430
Age > 64 -0.6586 0.3687 -1.7860 0.0740
Number of universities -0.1581 0.0527 -2.9970 0.0027
Low income * NE -2.8544 1.4549 -1.9620 0.0498
Low income * CE -2.6993 1.1830 -2.2820 0.0225
Low income * SO -2.7949 1.0546 -2.6500 0.0080
High income * NE 1.4516 1.3042 1.1130 0.2657
High income * CE 1.0076 1.3377 0.7530 0.4513
High income * SO 1.5754 1.2643 1.2460 0.2127
Low education * NE 2.5477 1.1462 2.2230 0.0262
Low education * CE 1.8295 1.1040 1.6570 0.0975
Low education * SO 1.9523 1.0820 1.8040 0.0712
High education * NE 1.2835 1.2661 1.0140 0.3107
High education * CE 2.3121 1.2099 1.9110 0.0560
High education * SO 0.3701 1.0900 0.3400 0.7342
Table 5 – Standard logit model with interactions.
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